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Every year, Australia identiﬁ  es 2–3 outbreaks associat-
ed with imported foods. To examine national authorities’ ob-
ligations under the International Health Regulations (2005), 
we reviewed outbreaks in 2001–2007 that implicated in-
ternationally distributed foods. Under these regulations, 7 
(50%) of 14 outbreaks would have required notiﬁ  cation to 
the World Health Organization.
D
uring the past 2 decades the global trade in food has 
increased, making outbreaks associated with inter-
nationally distributed foods more common (1). These 
outbreaks are challenging to identify and control. This is 
despite the involvement of multinational agencies, such 
as the World Health Organization (WHO), the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and surveil-
lance networks, such as PulseNet International and the Eu-
ropean Foodborne Viruses Network, which use molecular 
techniques to rapidly compare infecting strains (1–4). Food 
is a silent vehicle for spreading pathogens and chemicals 
across country borders (5). Whenever agencies responsible 
for health, agriculture, or food safety identify contaminated 
foods that are imported or exported, the potential for hu-
man illness to occur in other countries exists.
WHO recently revised the legally binding Interna-
tional Health Regulations (IHR) to respond more effec-
tively to the increasing spread of disease internationally 
(6). IHR (2005) are based on a risk assessment approach 
and came into force on June 15, 2007. Under IHR (2005), 
countries are required to designate or establish a National 
IHR Focal Point, which should be a national center for 
urgent communications under the regulations. These reg-
ulations include a decision-making instrument that lead 
National Focal Points through a series of 4 questions to 
assist them in making a decision to report events to WHO 
for international alert and response (Figure) (7). IHR 
(2005) cover events of international importance that in-
volve contaminated food and outbreaks of foodborne dis-
ease. In 2004, WHO, in collaboration with the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, launched 
the International Food Safety Authorities Network (IN-
FOSAN) to improve food safety information exchange 
and cooperation, including a food safety emergency com-
ponent (INFOSAN Emergency; see www.who.int/food-
safety/fs_management/infosan/en). WHO has developed 
guidance to illustrate how INFOSAN Emergency comple-
ments processes under IHR (2005) (8).
In Australia, health departments in 6 states and 2 ter-
ritories led multiagency teams to investigate and control 
≈100 outbreaks of foodborne disease that affected 2,000–
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Figure.  Decision instrument for the assessment and notiﬁ  cation 
of events that may constitute a public health emergency of 
international concern under International Health Regulations (IHR) 
(2005). WHO, World Health Organization. *As per WHO case 
deﬁ  nitions. †The disease list shall be used only for the purposes 
of these regulations; adapted from Annex II of IHR (2005), reported 
in (7).
Events detected by national surveillance system 
An event involving the 
following diseases shall 
always lead to use of the 
algorithm because they have 
demonstrated the ability to 
cause serious public health 
impact and to spread rapidly 
internationally
g: 
x  Cholera 
x  Pneumonic plague 
x  Yellow fever 
x  Viral hemorrhagic fevers 
(Ebola, Lassa, and 
Marburg) 
x  West Nile fever 
x  Other diseases that are of 
special national or 
regional concern, 
e.g., dengue fever, 
Rift Valley fever, 
and meningococcal 
disease. 
 
Any event that is a potential 
international public health 
concern, including those of 
unknown causes or sources 
and those involving other 
events or diseases than 
those listed in the box on the 
left and the box on the right 
shall lead to use of the 
algorithm. 
 A case of any of the 
following diseases is unusual 
or unexpected and may have 
serious public health impact 
and thus shall be notified*g: 
x  Smallpox 
x  Poliomyelitis due to wild-
type poliovirus 
x  Human influenza caused 
by a new subtype 
x  Severe acute respiratory 
syndrome 
OR 
Is the public health impact of 
the event serious? 
No  Yes 
Is the event unusual or 
unexpected? 
Yes 
Is the event unusual or 
unexpected? 
Yes  No  No 
No  No 
No 
Yes  Yes 
Yes 
Event Shall Be Notified to WHO under IHR 
Is there a significant risk for 
international spread? 
Is there a significant risk for 
international spread? 
Is there a significant risk for international 
travel or trade restrictions? 
Not notified at this stage. 
Reassess when more 
information becomes 
available. 
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4,000 people each year. The results of these investigations 
are summarized and reported to OzFoodNet, Australia’s 
national system of foodborne disease surveillance. When 
outbreaks are spread across jurisdictional or country bor-
ders, OzFoodNet coordinates national responses to deter-
mine the cause of the outbreak and prevent further spread. 
In this report, we assess well-characterized outbreaks 
of foodborne disease traced to internationally distributed 
foods. We used questions in the IHR decision-making al-
gorithm to examine whether these outbreaks would be po-
tentially reportable under IHR (2005). We also make some 
observations on investigating and managing these interna-
tional outbreaks from recent experiences, including inter-
action with INFOSAN Emergency.
The Outbreaks
In the 7-year period 2001–2007, 14 (1.8%) of 768 food-
borne outbreaks were associated with foods that were dis-
tributed internationally (online Appendix Table, available 
from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/9/1440-appT.htm). In 
total, these outbreaks affected at least 542 persons in Austra-
lia, 4.4% (542/12,423) of all those affected by foodborne dis-
ease outbreaks during the period. The median size of these 
outbreaks was 20 persons (range 3–230). The number of 
persons affected in other countries as a result of these events 
was unknown. Given the nature of foodborne disease, more 
outbreaks that we were unable to identify were likely associ-
ated with internationally distributed foods.
Several point-source outbreaks were related to each 
other by a common food source, even though the foods 
were often branded differently and supplied by different 
companies. The outbreaks of suspected norovirus infection 
(outbreaks 4, 6, and 9) were associated with individually 
quick frozen (IQF) oysters all harvested from the same re-
gion in Japan; this association was later conﬁ  rmed after a 
national investigation into 3 related outbreaks (outbreaks 
7, 8, and 10) (9). These outbreaks occurred over a 3-year 
period and resulted in Australia’s imposing restrictions on 
importation of IQF oysters from this growing area.
No outbreaks was considered to be of “serious public 
health impact” because of their small size and moderate 
severity. In 4 (29%) of 14 outbreaks, the event was consid-
ered “unusual or unexpected” in Australia because of novel 
disease-causing agents. However, agents considered novel 
in Australia were common causes of disease in the country 
exporting the food (10). In 5 (36%) of the 14 outbreaks, 
food had been distributed to other countries, resulting in 
multinational food recalls; 4 more events had the potential 
to spread to other countries. We identiﬁ  ed the implicated 
food for 2 outbreaks (outbreaks 1 and 14) because other 
countries rapidly published reports in Eurosurveillance 
Weekly. We alerted other countries to the implicated food 
for 3 other common-source outbreaks (outbreaks 3 and 5, 
by using rapid reports in the same publication and outbreak 
2 through ProMED Mail) (11–14).
During these investigations, we attempted to identify 
other countries that had also received contaminated food. 
Before the inception of INFOSAN, we relied on diplomatic 
communications with the exporting country, which were 
often unsuccessful. In a recent incident in which persons 
became infected with toxigenic Vibrio cholerae after eat-
ing raw whitebait (outbreak 13), INFOSAN Emergency 
made inquiries of the exporting country and conﬁ  rmed that 
ﬁ  sh had not been exported to other countries and that no 
outbreak was observed locally (15). During a multicountry 
outbreak of drug-resistant shigellosis (outbreak 14), INFO-
SAN Emergency Focal Point at WHO gained the exporting 
country’s cooperation to trace back the produce to the facil-
ity concerned and informed other countries receiving the 
same batch of produce (11) (online Appendix Table).
Conclusions
Although IHR (2005) only came into force in June 
2007, we consider that there would have been a basis for 
reporting 7 (50%) of 14 imported food outbreaks, with 3 
of these being part of the same IQF oyster contamination 
event. Although National IHR Focal Points may decide not 
to notify or report an outbreak under IHR (2005), it is vi-
tal that they publish rapid reports involving imported and 
exported foods, given the potential of these foods to spread 
disease internationally, and consult with WHO through 
INFOSAN Emergency. In this report, we considered only 
those events that resulted in human illness, but it is im-
portant for National IHR Focal Points to consult with the 
INFOSAN Emergency Contact Point for their country and 
to consider notifying and/or reporting events in which food 
is contaminated in the absence of human illness. Serious, 
unusual, or unexpected events associated with domestic 
food may also trigger the criteria, even when foods are not 
exported. Note that under Article 9.2 of IHR (2005), public 
health risks associated with importation of contaminated 
goods may be reported to WHO independent of the event’s 
meeting the Annex II criteria. This stipulation would al-
low reporting when available information is insufﬁ  cient to 
make an adequate assessment under Annex II. We found 
WHO INFOSAN Emergency complementary to the man-
agement of IHR (2005). The role of WHO and other agen-
cies in these events of potential international importance 
will undoubtedly continue to evolve.
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